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Prior studies on determinants of restatement and tax aggressiveness have been 
extensively published in accounting literature using data from different capital markets 
(Habib, et al. 2021; Huang and Nardi, 2020; Salehi et al. 2020; Blaufus et al., 2019; Wang 
and Zhang (2018); Baber et.al 2012; Balakrishnan et al., 2012; Hoi et al. 2013; Chen et al. 
2010). The evidences suggest that Board of Directors structure, audit firm attributes, 
auditor change, auditor tenure, securitization activities, and CEO characteristics are 
associated with restatementortax aggressiveness. Unlike foreign researchers, most 
researchers in Indonesia are more focused on the relation between business strategy on tax 
aggressiveness (Anggraini, et al. 2020; Faradiza 2019; Susanto et al. 2018; Wardani dan 
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Khoiriyah, 2018; Butar Butar, 2018; Wahyuni et al. 2018, Ihsan and Mustikasari, 2018; 
Surya, 2017; Kusumo and Meiranto, 2014) and the evidences are still inconclusive. The 
facts suggest that Indonesian researchers seem to have paid little or no attention on the 
association between business strategy and restatements. As far as the author knowledge, no 
studies have ever been conducted in Indonesia probing the issue. Evidence from emerging 
capital market may deepen our understanding on the role business strategy in shaping 
financial reporting practices in Indonesia. Therefore, this present study attempts to fill the 
gap and corroborate the findings form Indonesian capital market against other studies from 
different capital markets. 
Specifically, the purpose of this study is to explore the association between business 
strategy and restatements in emerging capital market. In addition, this study also 
reexamines the association between business strategy and tax aggressiveness to add new 
evidence by using new data. Moreover, several control variables representing corporate 
governance attributes are also included to mitigate the effect of extraneous variables. Board 
of Commissioners independence, Board of Commissioners size, Audit Committee 
expertise, and institutional ownership are included as control variables because prior 
studies suggest that these variables are associated with restatementand tax aggressiveness 
(Baberetal., 2012; Larckeretal. 2007; Baberetal., 2010). In addition, leverage, firm size, 
growth, and profitability are also included to control for differences in firm characteristics.  
Miles and Snow (1978, 2003) proposed four business strategies that map entire 
companies on a continum. The strategies are prospector, defender, analyzer and reactor. 
However, only three of which receive researchers’ great interest. Researchers rarely focus 
on reactors because this kind of strategy is hardly to be found in the real world. Firms that 
exhibit prospector characteristics are companies that focus on rapid adaptation to market 
changes. These companies rely on product innovation, quick response to exploit market 
opportunities, and faster growth. Prospectors constantly strive to make changes and 
aggressively exploit all opportunities available in the market. On the other hand, firms with 
a defender strategy mainly focus on cost efficiency, narrow product domains and stable 
organizational structures as ways to compete with competitors (Higgins et al., 2015). 
Defenders rarely make changes to their product mix, maintain product image, and have no 
interest in exploiting new markets. Firms with analyzer strategy have characteristics that 
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are a mixture of prospectors and defenders. Given the marked differences between 
prospector and defender strategy, their effects on the incidence of restatement and tax 
aggressiveness  should be expected.  
Chen etal. (2010) describe tax aggressiveness as an effort to reduce taxable income 
through tax planning resulting in less tax paid to the government. Furthermore, tax 
aggressiveness is anattitude of corporate aggression to pay lower taxes through tax 
planning and tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is an extreme form of tax aggressiveness 
(Boussaidi and Hamed, 2015). Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that tax aggressiveness 
is possible in situations that are complex and difficult to detect. Although tax 
aggressiveness is not a violation of the law, it is still considered dysfunctional behavior 
because it is driven by a desire to reduce the amount of tax that must be paid to the 
government. Since prospectors are more focused on product innovation and developing 
new markets, they are motivated to exploit every opportunity to engage in more aggressive 
tax reporting. 
Restatement occurs when financial statements deviate from generally accepted 
accounting principles. Flanagan et al (2008) conducted anexploratory study of 919 
restatements issued by the General Accounting Office (GAO) between January 1, 1997 and 
June 30, 2002. They discovered that restatements are not always associated with fraud. 
Some are triggered by unintentional mistakes in recording transactions relating to mergers, 
acquisitions, discontinued operations, stock splits and issues in different currencies. 
Additional analysis reveals that recognition of income, costs and expenses, and asset 
restructuring are the most dominating factor triggering the incidence of restatements. 
Meanwhile, Huron Consulting Group as cited in Abdullah et al (2010) reports that the main 
driving factors are income measurement, equity accounting, reserves, accruals, and 
contingencies. Furthermore, the likelihood of financial reporting irregularities is higher 
when incentive packages and company growth increase (Hogan et al., 2008).  
Since prospectors pursue high growth through product innovation and developing 
markets in new regions, the availability of massive financing for R&D activities is urgently 
required. Accordingly, prospectors are motivated to prepare attractive financial statements 
through erroneous accounting policies. In this sense, the possibility of prospectors to restate 
their financial statements is expectedly high. On the other hand, defenders are primarily 
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focused on cost leadership and thus have less incentive to manipulate accounting policies to 
boost earnings. In a such situation, the likelihood of restatement is expected to decrease.           
Zhizhong et al (2011) collected a sample of restatements from Chinese public 
companies and show that effective corporate governance prevents financial restatement 
occurrences. More specifically, they found that the proportion of independent 
Commissioners and the existence of the Audit Committee are negatively related to 
restatement. Abdullah et al (2010) examine restatement data from Malaysian stock market 
and find that the number of blockholders is associated with lowerre statements. However, 
Board of Commissioners independence and auditor quality are not significantly associated 
with restatements. In addition, Audit Committeeis inversely related to restatement but the 
directionis not consistent with the hypothesis. Nasri and Mohammadi (2015) collected a 
sample fromTehran Stock Exchange and provide evidence of negative association between 
Board of Commissioners independence and restatement. They also find that Audit 
Committeeis inversely related to restatements. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
Business Strategy Typology 
Increased business environment uncertainties have forced firms to develop the most 
suited strategy to survive and prosper in fierce market competition. A well-fitted business 
strategy will ultimately determine future success through improving firm’s competitive 
advantage (Dvorský et al.,2020). Various types of business strategies along with rational 
behind them have been widely discussed and empirically examined in strategic 
management literature (Fuertes et al., 2020). The findings suggest that companies follow 
certain patterns to anticipate changes in surrounding business environments The most 
widely recognized typology is the one that was proposed by Miles and Snow (1978, 2003). 
They develop a business strategy typology based on the speed at which companies adjust 
their product mix to the changing market environment. By observing patterns that firms 
follow in anticipating business changes, Miles and Snow (1978, 2003) propose four 
business strategies: prospector, defender, analyzer, and reactor. However, previous studies 
in the field of management and accounting mostly compare between prospector and 
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Prospectors possess certain characteristics that heavily focus on product innovation, 
expanding market share, fast growth, and constant changes to achieve competitive 
advantage through offering best price and service (Wang et al., 2021). These firms require 
large financing in support of marketing and R&D activities which are directed to develop 
product mix and to react quickly to the changing business environment. On the other hand, 
defenders intensely direct firm resources to maintain stability, avoiding risk, and protecting 
the existing market through continuous improvement of their technology use (Navissi et al., 
2017). They are not interested in expanding market share through product innovation but 
only concentrated on a narrow market.  In other word, defenders tend to develop similar 
products rather than developing new products. In addition, theyare continuously striving for 
efficiency in financing and production activities. With these characteristics, defenders 
pursue constant growth through market penetration. As for Analyzer, they possess 
characteristics that are a combination of prospectors and defenders and constantly adapt to 
technology, management and marketing capabilities (Bently et al., 2013). Finally, 
companies with reactor strategies tend to be slow in adapting environmental changes and 
also have less business integration( Bently et al., 2013).  
Following prior studies (Wang et al., 2021; Hassan, 2021; Navissi et al., 2017, Houge 
et al. 2017; Bently et al., 2013), this study focuses on prospector and defender due to 
marked characteristics differences. Specifically, this study examines the association 
between the two strategies with restatement and tax aggressiveness. 
Financial Restatement 
Financial restatement, or widely stated as restatement in empirical research, occurs 
when financial statementsare not prepared in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles. According to Abbot etal (2004), three factors might be attributed to 
the incidence of restatements.First, inherent factors such as aggressive accounting 
practices, incorrect application of GAAP, and staffing problems. Second, inadequate 
internal control to prevent or detect material misstatements. Third, the failure of external 
auditors to detect material misstatements. Recommendation of financial restatement might 
be initiated by firms, auditors, or driven by regulations. 
Flanagan et al (2008) conducted an exploratory study of 919 restatements issued 
byGeneral Accounting Office (GAO) between January 1, 1997, and June 30, 2002.They 
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suggest that restatements must not necessarily associate with fraud but may be triggered by 
accounting errors resulting from mergers, acquisitions, discontinued operations, stock splits 
and currency issues. Furthermore, three most dominant factors driving restatement were 
errors in revenue, cost and expense recognitionand asset restructuring. Meanwhile, Huron 
Consulting Group (2003) as cited in Abdullah etal (2010) reported that the main factors 
driving the restatement are revenue recognition, equity accounting, reserves, accruals, and 
contingencies.  
Previous studies consistently found that restatements were associated with declining 
firm values. Richardson et.al (2002) report that the stock values decline following the 
announcement of restatements. Hribar and Jenkins (2004) show that the cost of capital for 
restating firmsis higher than for non-restating firms. Palmrose et al. (2004) found that 
restating firms experience a negative two-day abnormal return around the restatement 
announcement. In addition, restatements are positively associated with bankruptcy or law 
suits. Restatements drive investors to have a negative view of corporate auditors. Palmrose 
and Sholz (2004) show that restatements trigger negative reaction from investors. 
Restatement also affects manager’s reputation. Desai etal (2006) provide evidence that the 
restating firm’s manager is most likely to lose his job.   
The role of corporate governance mitigating financial restatements has become an 
interesting research topic that attracting researchers from developed and developing 
countries. Baber etal. (2012), Larcker etal. (2007), Abbott etal. (2004), and Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) collected samples of American firms. Meanwhile, Butar Butar (2018), 
Zhizhong et al (2011), and La Porta et al (1999) gathered samples from developing capital 
markets. 
Business Strategy and Restatement 
Prospectors pursue competitive advantage through product innovations and market 
expansion. Accordingly, a huge external financing is required to support Research and 
Development (R&D) activities, especially from the capital market. Intense focuses on 
product innovation and product differentiation to boost sales growth requires aggressive 
business conducts and demand highly skillful risk-taker workers. Those involved in risky 
projects are expected to demand a proper compensation package in order to be willing to 
work in a situation where success in creating and selling new productsis highly 
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unpredictable (Rajagopalan, 1997; Sing and Agrawal, 2002). A study conducted by Simon 
(1987) supports argument that prospectors exhibit aggressive behavior in spurring growth. 
Prior studies documented bulk of evidence that business strategy is associated with 
financial reporting integrity (Hassan, 2021; Pourali, et al. 2019; Xiangfeng and Xine, 2018; 
Hogan et al. 2008; Bently, et al. 2013). Hogan et al. (2008) suggested that Prospectors’ 
emphasis in rapid growth increases the likelihood of financial reporting irregularities. 
Rapid growth through product innovation requires large investments and massive external 
source of capital, mainly from equity investors. A desire to generate large amount of 
external fund creates an incentive to hide true financial results. Prospectors are motivated to 
manage investor belief in order to look good in the eyes of investors. However, such 
dishonest conducts may not go undetected and thus increase the likelihood of financial 
restatements. On the other hand, defenders that largely focuses on efficiency have no such 
urgency to generate external funds. No reasonable motivation to mislead investors through 
unsound accounting policies making incidence of restatement decreases. 
Another reason that may compel prospectors to intervene financial reporting is 
related to compensation packages. Aggressive business conducts demand risk-taker 
workers. Prospectors have to offer interesting incentive to attracts skillful workers to 
participate in risky projects.  Bentley et al. (2013) argue that compensation packages induce 
irregularities in financial statements. An aggressive performance-based compensation 
requires massive resources that is primarily generated from equity investors. In order to 
accomplish the necessary funds, firms should have impressive financial results to attracts 
investors. They are most likely to engage in accounting manipulation achieve expected 
targets and thus increases the likelihood of restatement. Hassan (2021) suggest that 
business strategy is associated with financial reporting process. Xiangfeng and Xine (2018) 
find that radical strategy is associated with higher earnings management. 
On the other hand, defendersare less compelled to provide aggressive performance-
based compensation because they are mainly concerned on finding ways to maintain 
product market share and less involved in high risky projects. Therefore, compensation 
packagesoffered by these companies do not encourage aggressive behavior (Rajagopalan, 
1997; Sing and Agrawal, 2002) and it can be expected that firms with such characteristics 
are less likely to select inapropriate accounting policies that might lead to restatements. 
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Based on the preceeding discussion, relationship between business strategy and restatement 
is formulated in the following hypothesis:         
H1: Prospectors are more likely to restate their financial statements relative to the  
defenders.  
Business Strategy and Tax Aggressiveness 
Defenders are very concerned about customer satisfaction and make every effort to 
protect the existing market through continuous improvement (Navissi et al., 2017). They 
spend much of their time and effort to find new ways to improve product qualities and 
lower production costs. Apart from reducing selling prices and improving product qualities, 
defendersare also concerned about their reputation and image. Since maintaining good 
image and reputation have been primarily focused by defenders, they tend to refrain from 
unethical conduct and deviant business practices. Pursuing competitive advantage through 
cost leadership and maintaining company image suppresses aggressive tax reporting 
behavior. Therefore, it is expected that defenders are less likely to engage in tax 
aggressiveness. 
On the other side, characteristics of prospectors provide wider opportunities to 
engage in tax aggressiveness because massive capital is required to exploit new markets 
and create new products. Accordingly, prospectors aggressively seek opportunities to report 
lower income taxes in order to secure sufficient funds for intended risky projects and more 
likely to engage in tax aggressiveness. Prior studies examining the relationship between 
company characteristics and tax avoidance have reported that companies with prospector 
characteristics tend to engage in tax avoidance (Mills et al., 1998; Phillips, 2003). 
Similarly, recent studies also reported that business strategy is associated with tax 
aggressiveness. Wang (2017) shows that prospectors are more likely involved in tax 
avoidance. Higgins et al. (2015) reported that prospectors have higher propensity to engage 
in tax aggressive behavior. Sadjiarto et al. (2020) reported that prospectors are associated 
with higher tax avoidance. Based on the preceding discussion, the relationship between 
business strategy and restatement can be formulated in the following hypothesis: 
H2: Prospectors engaged in greater tax aggressiveness than defenders 
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3. RESEACH METHOD 
Sample 
The sample is firms listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period of 2014-2018. 
The necessary data were collected from annual reports and had been downloaded from 
www.idx.co.id. As much as 1630 firm-year observations were available after applying a 
purposive sampling method. Table 1 presents sample selection procedure in detail. 
Table 1. Sample Selection Procedure. 
Descriptions Company-years 
Firm-year observations in the period of 2014-2018.  2664 
Delisted firms during sample period.  (49) 
Firms belong to the insurance, securities and banking industry. (550) 
Annual reports are stated in US Dollars as a denominator. (247) 
Annual reports are unavailable from the data source. (188) 
Total Observations  1630 
 
Model Specification 
As described earlier, the purpose of this study is to test the effect of business strategy 
on restatements and tax aggressiveness. Two separate regression models are employed to 
test hypotheses. Model 1 is estimated with logistic regression to test the effect of business 
strategy on restatement. Model 2 is estimated with multiple regressions to assess the role of 
business strategy on tax aggressiveness. Note that eight control variables are included in the 
model to control for differences in corporate governance practices and firm characteristics. 
Model 1: Restateit = β0+ β1Strategyit +β2BdIndpit + β3BdSizeit+ β4AudComit-
+β5Instit+β6Levit+β7Sizeit+ β8Growthit+β9ROAit+ εit  
Model 2: CETRit = β0+ β1Strategyit +β2Bd_Indpit+ β3Bd_Sizeit+ β4AudComit-
+β5Instit+β6Levit+β7Sizeit+ β8Growthit+β9ROAit+ εit  
Where,  
Restate = Restatment 
Strategy  = Business strategy 
CETR  = Tax Aggressiveness 
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BdIndp  = Board of CommissionersIndependence 
BdSize  = Board Size 
AudCom = Audit Committee Expertise 
Inst  = Institutional Ownership 
Lev   = Leverage 
Size  = Company size 
Growth = Company Growth 




Following Navissi et al. (2017), four ratios were used to capture dimensions of 
business strategy: (1) ratio of general and administrative expenses to total sales (to capture 
marketing efforts); (2) percentage change in annual sales (to capture growth patterns); (3) 
employee to sales ratio (to capture production efficiency); (4) standard deviation of the 
number of company employees (to capture organizational stability). For each year, the four 
variables are sorted from lowest to highest and grouped into five quintiles. Each group is 
given a score of 1 to 5. Thus, a company that scores 1 will have a total score of 4, which is 
the lowest score. A company that scores 5 for the four variables will have a score of 20, 
which is the highest score. The final scores will be in the range of 4-20. The next step is to 
calculate the median score. The total score for each company is then compared to the 
median value. Business strategy is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the score is above 
median and classified as prospectors. Likewise, a firm is classified as defenders if its score 
is below median.   
Restatement 
Restatement is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a company restated its financial 
statement and 0 otherwise. Information on restatements is observed manually from 
financial statements. Note that restatement might be triggered by the application of new 
standards, earnings management, mergers and acquisitions, and mathematical errors. This 
study does not take into account the causes of restatements from merger and acquisition, 
stock split, and mandatory changes in accounting standards. These factors are part of 
regular events that may cause restatements but they should not be regarded as intention 
restatements (Plumlee and Yohn, 2010; Hennes et al. 2012; Lobo and Zhao, 2013). 
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Tax Aggressiveness 
Following Desai and Dharmapala (2006), tax aggressivenessis measured as a ratio of 
tax paid in cash to income before tax (CETR = tax paid / income before tax). For ease of 
interpretation, CETR is multiplied with -1 so that the higher CETR ratio suggests higher 
tax aggressiveness.  
Control Variables 
Board of CommissionersIndependence 
Aggressive behavior that triggers restatement and tax aggressiveness is an example of 
dysfunctional behavior. Prior studies have reported that Board of Commissioners 
independence is negatively associated with manager dysfunctional behavior (Beasely, 
1996; Klein, 2002, Xie et al., 2003). Thus, it is expected that Board independence is 
negatively associated with restatement and tax aggressiveness. The Board of 
Commissioners independence is measured as a proportion of independent Commissioners 
to the total of  the Board of Commissioners.  
Audit Committee Expertise 
Previous studies have shown that the Audit Committee expertise is negatively 
associated with lower abnormal accruals, restatements, and cases of lawsuits (Abbot et al, 
2004; Bedard et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005). Thus, it is reasonable to control this 
variable. Audit Committee expertise is measured as the proportion of Audit Committee 
members who have backgrounds in accounting or finance. It is expected that Audit 
Committee expertise is negatively associated with restatement and tax aggressiveness.    
Institutional Ownership 
Previous studies found that ownership concentration reduces agency problems 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; La Porta et al., 1999). Effective monitoring by institutional 
investors may prevent managers from manipulating financial reporting for private gain 
(Hartzell et al., 2014). Institutional ownership is measured as a percentage of shares owned 
by institutional investors. It is expected that institutional ownership is negatively associated 
with restatement and tax aggressiveness. 
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Firm Characteristics 
Firm size, leverage, sales growth, and profitability were previously reported to have 
an effect on restatement and tax aggressiveness (Chen et al., 2010; Bentley et al., 2013). 
For this reason, these variables are included in the model to control for the differences in 
firm characteristics. The control variables are measured as follows: 1) firm size is Ln total. 
2) leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 3) Sales growth is current sales minus 
last year sales divided by current sales. 4) Profitability is the ratio of net income to total 
asset. These variables, except leverage, are expected to be negatively associated with 
restatement and tax aggressiveness 
 
4. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variabel N Minimum Maximum Mean Stand. Dev 
Restate 1420 0 0.039 0.036 0.188 
CETR 1420 -2.633 2.246 0.234 0.422 
Strategy 1420 0 1 0.641 0.479 
Bd_Indp 1420 0.167 0.833 0.406 0.101 
Bd_Size 1420 2 10 4,170 1,702 
AudCom 1420 0,250 1 0,730 0.245 
Inst 1420 1.950 100 0.657 0.210 
Size 1420 21.361 33.474 28.575 1.601 














As much as 1630 firm-years observations were available for further analysis. 
However, 210 observations were eliminated to minimize the effect of extreme values on the 
results. After going through the process of elimination, the remaining observations for the 
test of hypothesis are 1420. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of variables in the study. 
Note that Restate is a dummy variable that has a mean of 0.036. It suggests that 3.6% 
of observations or about 51 are restating firms. Meanwhile, the mean for tax aggressiveness 
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(CETR) is 0.234, suggesting that the tax rate imposed on sample firms is 23.4%. Corporate 
strategy (Strategy), which is a dummy variable, has a mean of 0.641, suggesting that 64.1% 
of observations adopted the defender strategy. While the remaining 35.9% employs a 
prospector strategy. Mean for Board of Commissioners independence (Bd_Indp) of 0.406 
indicates that 40.6% of Board of Commissioner members are from outside the company. 
The mean of 4,170 for Board size (Bd_Size) suggests that on average the Board of 
Commissioners consists of four or five people. Meanwhile, the mean for background of the 
Audit Committee (AudCom) and institutional ownership are 0.730 and 0.657, respectively. 
These numbers suggest that 73% of firms’ Audit Committee have an accounting or 
financial background and 65.7% of the shares are owned by institutional investors. As for 
control variables, the statistics suggest that sample firms are medium-sized firms with a 
growth rate of 7.9%, moderate leverage level with the mean for debt to total asset ratio of 
43.7% and low profitability with net income to asset ratio of 3.8%. 
Correlation Coefficients 
Table 3. Correlation Coefficient 
 Restate CETR Strategy Bd_Indp Bd_Size AudCom Inst Size ROA Lev Growth 
Restate  1 0.011 -0,018 -0.021 0.005 -0.033 -0,041 0,030 0.009 -0,013 -0,034 
CETR  0.011 1 -0.062* -0.053* -0.030 0.051 -0,033 -0,005 0.147** -0,016   0,064* 
Strategy  -0.018 -0.062* 1 0.024 -0.001 -0.056* 0,044 -0,020 -0.008 -0,026 0,047 
Bd_Indp  -0.021 -0.053* 0.024 1 -0.061* 0,011 0,056* 0,066* 0.013 0,120** 0,008 
Bd_Size  0.005 0.030 -0.001 -0.061* 1 -0.023 -0.070** 0.560** 0.157** 0.037 0.014 
AudCom  -0.033 0.051 -0.056* 0.011 -0.023 1 0,118** -0,023 0.006 0,008 -0,018 
Inst  -0.041 -0.033 0.044 0.056* -0.070** 0.118** 1 -0,168** 0.028 -0,041 0,017 
Size  0.030 -0.005 -0.020 0.066** 0.560** -0.023 -0,168** 1 0.156** 0,106** 0,085** 
ROA  0.009 0.147** -0.008 0.013 0.157** 0.006 0.028 0.156** 1 -0.270 0.178** 
Lev  -0.013 -0.016 -0,026 0.120** 0.037 0,008 -0,041 0,106** -0.270** 1 -0,026 
Growth  -0.034 0.064* 0,047 0.008 0.014 -0,018 0,017 0,085** 0.178** -0,026 1 
 
*Signifikan pada tingkat 5%, **Signifikan pada tingkat 1% 
Table 3 shows that restatement (Restate) and strategy are not statistically correlated 
(two tails). Similarly, none of the control variables is correlated with strategy. Correlation 
between dependent variables and independent variables is presented first to see the pattern 
of the relationship between these variables. Table 3 presents the correlation coefficients for 
all variables. However, discussion is focused on the correlation between strategy and 
restatement and on the correlation between strategy and ax aggressiveness. These are 
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preliminary evidences to reject H1. On the other hand, tax aggressiveness (CETR) and 
strategy are negatively correlated at 10% level of significance. Three control variables are 
statistically correlated with CETR at 1% and 5%. More specifically, CETR is negatively 
correlated with Bd_Indp at 5%. CETR and ROA are positively correlated at 1%. 
Significant correlation is also found for CETR and Growth at 5%. The correlation results 
provide preliminary evidence to accept H2. 
Results  
Hypothesis one (H1) posits that the prospectors are more likely to issue financial 
restatements relative to the defenders. Hypothesis two (H2) posits that the prospectors are 
engaged in greater tax aggressiveness than defenders. The two hypotheses are tested by 
estimating two separate regression models as described earlier. Logistic regression is used 
to estimate Model 1 and multiple regressions analysis is used to estimate Model 2. Table 4 
presents the estimation results for the two models.  
Estimation of Model 1 shows the likelihood of issuing financial restatements is no 
different between prospectors and defenders as indicated from p-value of 0.573. The result 
suggests that business strategy is not associated with restatement. Similarly, all control 
variables are statistically insignificant at the traditional level of significance, suggesting 
that corporate governance and firm’s characteristics differences have no effect on the 
incidence of restatements. Thus, H1 is not supported statistically. 
On the other hand, estimation of Model 2 shows that business strategy is positively 
associated with tax aggressiveness. Note again that strategy is a dummy variable that takes 
1 for prospectors and 0 for defenders. The positive coefficient suggests that CETR of 
prospectors is greater than of defenders with p-value of 0.029. In other word, firms with 
prospector strategy are engaged in tax aggressiveness more than defenders. Thus, H2 is 
statistically supported.    
As for corporate governance variables, the results show that Board independence 
(BdIndp), Audit Committees expertise (Aud_Com) and institutional ownership (Inst) are 
negatively associated with tax aggressiveness (CETR). Specifically, the correlation 
between CETR and BdIndp is significant at the 10% level. The correlation between CETR 
and institutional ownership is significant at the 10% level as well. However, the correlation 
between CETR and Aud_Com is significant at 5% level. Similar results are also found for 
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firms’ characteristics variables. Specifically, the correlation between CETR and ROA is 
significant at 1%. The correlation between CETR and size is significant at 10%. Lastly, the 
correlation between CETR and growth is significant at 10% 




Model 1 Model 2 
Wald-Stat P-value T-Stat P-value 
Strategy + 0.317 0.573 2.188 0.029 
BdIndp - 0.638 0.424 1.875 0.061 
BdSize - 0.557 0.455 -1.007 0.314 
Aud_Com - 1.321 0.250 -2.011 0,044 
Inst - 1.235 0.266 1.704 0,089 
Size - 1.704 0.192 1.815 0,070 
Lev + 0.205 0.650 -1.229 0,219 
Growth - 2.206 0.137 -1.775 0.076 
ROA - 0.167 0.683 -5,441 0.000 
 
Discussions  
Association Between Business Strategy and Restatement 
As previously discussed, firms tend to choose a business strategy that best fits their 
surrounding business environment. In order to anticipate rapid and unexpected changes in 
the business environment, prospectors are more likely to focus on introducing new products 
and actively exploiting opportunities to create new markets in areas that have never been 
entered. Such an aggressive strategy requires large external financing to support research 
and product development activities. As a consequence, prospectors must find ways to 
attract investors, and one of them is through manipulating accounting policies to present 
impressive financial performance. But note that overly emphasis on innovation creates 
greater uncertainty of the outcome. Risky projects require risk-taking managers. The 
compensation package must be designed in certain ways to encourage managers to take 
risks. The compensation package associated with aggressive behavior increases the 
likelihood of financial misreporting (Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007) and in 
turn triggers restatement. 
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On the other hand, defenders are more focused on cost leadership and confined to less 
risky products. Intense focus on efficiency lowers the risks associated with market demand 
of their products. In addition, defenders are more inclined to choose product efficiency for 
they possess sufficient knowledge of the competitiveness landscape. They concentrate on 
maintaining existing product market share. Since the strategy does not require aggressive 
behaviors, the compensation packages offered by defenders do not encourage aggressive 
behaviors (Rajagopalan, 1997; Sing and Agrawal, 2002). Therefore, motivations for 
seeking massive external financing and the urge to window dress financial reports is 
expectedly lower. As a result, the likelihood of financial restatement remains low. Bentley 
et al. (2013) examine the effect of business strategy on financial reporting irregularities and 
find that prospectors are more likely to experience financial irregularities. 
 Contrary to the prediction, the evidence shows that business strategy is not 
significantly associated with restatements. Moreover, it is not consistent with prior studies 
documented in Hassan (2021), Pourali, et al. (2019), Xiangfeng and Xine. (2018), Hogan et 
al. (2008). These studies showed that business strategy has significant effect on financial 
reporting policies. The insignificant result is probably related to the sample characteristics. 
Descriptive statistics show that on average the sample is taken from medium-sized 
companies with moderate growth rates and low debt levels. The fact that firm samples have 
a relatively low level of debt suggests that these firms require no large external financing to 
support profit creation activities. In this stable condition, firms are not inherently compelled 
to manipulate financial statements which might trigger restatements. Future research should 
address the problem and gather sample with more heterogeneous characteristics. Another 
possible explanation is the procedure used in this study to distinguish restating and non-
restating firms might be inaccurate. As described before, firm samples were divided into 
restating and non-restating firms based on observation in annual reports without giving 
consideration to the reasons underlying restatements. It is possible that a firm restated its 
financial statement due to reasons other than accounting error. Incorrect inclusion of firms 
as restating firms may lessen the effect of business strategy on restatements. Therefore, 
future research should consider reasons for restatements when dividing firm samples into 
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Association Between Business Strategy and Tax Aggressiveness 
The test of hypothesis suggests that prospectors are more aggressive in managing tax 
planning relative to defenders. Prospectors intensely pursue product innovation and seek 
new business opportunities. They are willing to take risks to attain high growth. 
Consequently, prospectors tend to take aggressive actions to exploit any opportunities 
available to reduce tax spending and save sufficient cash to finance new investment 
projects. On the other hand, defenders are mainly focused on maintaining reputation, image 
and cost leadership. Maintaining stability through narrow and stable product and avoiding 
financial reporting risks are the goals (Bently et al., 2013). Such different focuses have 
implications for corporate tax management. Martinez and Ferreira (2019) suggest that 
effective tax planning provides an opportunity to reduce tax burden.   
The evidence found in this study is consistent with Phillips (2003), Higgins et al. 
(2015), and Sadjiarto et al. (2020). Phillips (2003) found that firms with prospector 
characteristics are more likely to engage in tax avoidance suggesting more aggressive 
behavior toward tax planning.Higgins et al. (2015) state that different focus of the two 
strategies are reflected in the organizational structure, risk tolerance, and strategic focus of 
the company. Defenders tend to avoid risks and have centralized organizational structures. 
Prospectors, on the other hand, are more willing to take risks and tend to have a 
decentralized organizational structure. They examine the effect of business strategy on tax 
aggressiveness by employing three measures; book effective tax rate, cash effective tax 
rate, and permanent book-tax differences. The test results show that prospectors have lower 
book and cash effective tax rates and higher permanent book-tax differences suggesting 
that prospectors are more aggressive in their tax policies relative to defenders. Additional 
test reveals that prospectors are more likely to operate in tax haven countries. Sadjiarto et 
al. (2020) found that prospectors exhibit more aggressive behavior on tax reporting 
practices.  
Martinez and Ferreira (2019) analyze the typology of business strategies in Brazil. 
The analysis shows that most Brazilian companies have the characteristics of an analyzer 
which is a mixture of prospectors and defenders. Furthermore, companies that adopt the 
defender and prospector strategy are 21% and 1.76% respectively. They also tested whether 
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prospector firms are more inclined to tax aggressiveness than defenders. Surprisingly, they 
found that defenders engaged in more aggressive tax planning than prospectors.  
Corporate governance and the firm’s characteristics      
The presence of independent commissioners is expected to improve monitoring 
function of the Board of Commissioners. Unique expertise and experience an independent 
commissioner bring into the company enhance the ability of the Board of Commissioners 
to detect financial reporting manipulation. In addition, independent commissioners are 
expected to have higher motivation in supervising managers for the need to show 
impressive performance which increases their reputation in the labor market. They also 
have a stronger incentive to maintain shareholders’ belief in their capabilities for the sake 
of future career. Related to monitoring functions, independent Commissioners are expected 
to be able to escape pressure from managers when voicing criticism and providing 
suggestions to uphold good corporate governance. They can act impartially when 
discussing supervisory issues, including financial reporting process. Consequently, 
effective monitoring toward financial reports mitigates the opportunities for managers to 
exploit company resources for personal gain. It also prevents managers from hiding the 
dysfunctional behavior through certain accounting policies. Tendency for managers to use 
accounting policies that do not reflect economic reality can be suppressed or even 
eliminated and in turn reduces the incidence of restatements. The logic for including an 
independent commissioner to enhance the Board’s monitoring function is also applied to 
the size of the Board of Commissioners. The larger Board of Commissioners is expected to 
increase monitoring function.   
However, the test results only find a weak relationship between Board of 
Commissioners size and restatement with p-value of 0.061 and no significant effect of 
Board independence on restatement. The evidence suggests that the Board of 
Commissioners was not able to perform effective monitoring function. In particular, 
independent commissioners seem to fail to contribute to effective monitoring. The 
insignificant effect may be partially explained by the process of hiring independent 
commissioners. It should be noted that the firm’s directors may have contributed to the 
process of appointing independent commissioners. The situation can create a conflict of 
interest which may harm the loyalty of the independent commissioner to stockholders 
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(Pass, 2004). As a consequence, an independent commissioner may not perform well in 
carrying out his monitoring function. 
Similar result is also found for tax-aggressiveness. The existence of independent 
commissioners has no effect on corporate tax management policy. The result may be 
explained by using the argument of tax avoidance benefit for shareholders. As a 
shareholder's representative, the Board of Commissioners must put shareholders’ interests 
before other things in companies. From this perspective, aggressive behavior toward tax 
policies might bring positive consequences on shareholders. Conceptually, tax avoiding 
activities would generate cash flow to the companies enabling them to invest in many 
projects. These projects generate more profit that attracts more investors to buy more 
stocks. In turn, high demand for the company’s stock drives stock prices up. On the other 
hand, tax avoidance may be deemed unethical by some investors and independent 
commissioners are expected to prevent the unethical business practices.     
Audit Committees with accounting or financial backgrounds are expected to have 
necessary skills to prevent financial reporting irregularities. A number of studies show that 
the Audit Committee with a financial or accounting background is better able to prevent 
unhealthy accounting practices and thus reducing the occurrence of restatements. But this 
study finds no evidence of such convictions suggesting that restatement can occur in any 
companies regardless of Audit Committee background. The result is rather confusing. It is 
difficult to explain why Audit Committee with financial or accounting background are not 
associated with the incidence of restatements. One possibility is that the measure of 
restatements in this study is unreliable to distinguish between restatement triggered by 
mistakes in selecting accounting policies and restatement caused by other reasons such as 
mergers or new standards imposed by accounting authorities. As stated before, this study 
does not take into account the reasons for restatements. It could be triggered by 
unintentional errors in applying sound accounting policies or other reasons irrelevant of 
accounting such as mathematical errors or mergers. In addition, there is a possibility that a 
company issues financial restatement due to errors in interpreting a particular accounting 
standard. 
Contradictory results are found for tax-aggressiveness. The results suggest that Audit 
Committee with accounting or finance background have the capability to mitigate 
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managers' aggressive behavior toward tax planning. Effort to opportunistically reduce tax 
spending can be considered dysfunctional behavior because it causes negative effects on 
government which has responsibility to provide infrastructures needed for businesses to 
grow and thrive in the profit-making process. Effective Audit Committee functions can 
only be achieved through adequate understanding of accounting and financial issues 
encountered by in daily activities.   
Firms with high institutional ownership are expected to reduce the incidence of 
restatements. Institutional investors arguably have sufficient capacity and resources to 
monitor companies. The capacity to close scrutiny over strategic and financial issues 
mitigate the opportunities for managers to influence financial reporting. Accordingly, errors 
in the presentation of financial statements can be prevented and the possibility of 
restatement is decreased. However, the evidence found in this study is not consistent with 
the predictions. It seems that institutional investors fail to exercise its monitoring function 
effectively. One possible explanation is due to the small number of shares that institutional 
investors have that causes them to be reluctant to monitor managers. This possibility can be 
rejected because the descriptive statistics show that on average institutional investors own 
63.5% of firm samples’ stocks. The percentage is quite large to be able to perform close 
monitoring on companies. Another possibility is that the procedure to determine 
restatement in this study does not distinguish the causes of restatement as previously stated.   
Firms with higher institutional ownership are predicted to be less aggressive in their 
tax policies. But the results are not consistent with the prediction. It is probably due to the 
benefit of tax avoidance for institutional investors. Institutional investors are primarily 
concerned with managerial opportunistic behavior that is inconsistent with their interests. 
From the standpoint of institutional investors, tax aggressiveness does not have a negative 
effect on their stock investments. On the contrary, tax aggressiveness might enhance firm 
value because the amount of cash that is supposed to be paid to the government can be 
diverted to finance profitable projects which have a positive effect on the firm’s stock 
price. Thus, the aggressive tax policies are not associated with the number of shares owned 
by institutional investors. 
As for the firm’s characteristics, the results show that firm size, growth, and 
profitability are associated with tax aggressiveness. The evidence is consistent with Zheng 
et al. (2019). In addition, firm size, leverage, growth and profitability have no effect on the 
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restatement. The insignificant results are consistent with Bentley et al. (2013). Taken 
together, the evidence suggests that the firm’s characteristics matter only in tax planning. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In increasingly fierce competition, companies must adopt strategies that help improve 
their firm’s competitiveness. Two business strategies have received wide attention of 
academics and researchers. Prospectors emphasize product innovation and rapid market 
response to achieve intended growth rates. They are striving to make changes and very 
aggressive to exploit any opportunities in the market. On the other hand, defenders are 
intensely focused on efficiency and stability and not interested in product innovations. 
Since prospectors are actively engaged in product innovation and developing new 
markets, large cash flow is needed to support those activities. The need for large funds 
encourages companies to engage in more aggressive tax reporting than defenders. On the 
other hand, defenders are not relatively aggressive in managing taxes because they do not 
want to create a negative impression that can damage the company's image and reputation. 
In addition, defenders do not have many opportunities to engage in tax aggressiveness 
because they are rarely involved in risky projects and have no desire to rapid growth 
providing fewer opportunities to aggressive behavior. 
A part from tax aggressiveness, prospectors and defenders also differ in the 
likelihood of restatements. Prospectors’ focus on rapid growth through product innovation 
and market expansion require large external financing for R&D activities. They must 
attract investors to invest in the company. One way is to constantly display impressive 
financial performance. Prospectors are compelled to window dress financial statements 
through inappropriate accounting policies. Mistakes in choosing sound accounting policies 
increase the likelihood of restatements. On the other hand, defenders that prioritize 
efficiency and cost leadership do not have an urgent need to obtain large numbers of funds. 
Thus, the motivation to choose inappropriate accounting policies to make a better financial 
report is diminished, and the incidence of financial restatement can be avoided. 
This study examines the effect of corporate strategy on tax aggressiveness and 
restatement. To increase the validity of the research results, eight control variables related 
to company characteristics and corporate governance are included in the regression model. 
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The control variables are firm size, leverage, growth rate, profitability, board of 
commissioners independence, board of commissioners size, audit committee expertise, and 
institutional ownership.  
The regression results show that while business strategy has a significant effect on tax 
aggressiveness, no significant effect found for restatements. As for control variables, board 
of commissioners independence, board of commissioners size, audit committee expertise, 
and institutional ownership are not associated with restatement. Conversely, board of 
commissioners independence, audit committee expertise, and institutional ownership are 
significantly associated with tax aggressiveness. Taken together, the results suggest that 
business strategy and corporate governance play a significant role in managers’ aggressive 
behavior toward tax planning but not for the incidence of financial restatements. As for the 
firm’s characteristics, results show that firm size, leverage, growth and profitability are not 
significantly associated with restatement. The insignificant results are consistent with 
Bentley et al. (2013). On the contrary, firm size, growth, and profitability are significantly 
associated with tax aggressiveness. The findings are consistent with Zheng et al. (2019). 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the firm’s characteristics matter only in tax 
planning. 
6. LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
None of the independent variables have significant effects on restatement, which 
raises the issue of measurement. As described before, it is possible that a firm restated its 
financial statement due to reasons other than accounting error. Incorrect inclusion of firms 
as restating firms may result in no association between all independent variables, including 
business strategy, with restatements. In addition, the number of companies classified as 
restated firms is only 3,6%, making the conclusion need to be made carefully. Therefore, 
subsequent research needs to consider restatement measurements which are limited only to 
the application of inappropriate accounting policies. Companies that perform restatements 
due to mergers and changes in accounting standards should be excluded from the sample. 






Vol.15, No.2, Juli 2021 
 




Abbott, J.L., Parker,S.,&Peters, G.F. (2004). Audit committee characteristics 
andrestatements. Auditing, 23, 69-87. 
Abdullah, S.N., Yusof,M.Z.N, &Nor, M.N.M. (2010). Financial restatements and corporate 
governance among Malaysian listed companies. Managerial Auditing Journal, 25(6), 
526-552. 
Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J.F., & Karpoff, J.M. (1999). Management turnover and governance 
changes following the revelation of fraud. Journal of Law and Economics, 42, 309-
342. 
Agrawal, A., & Chadha, S. (2005). Corporate governance and accounting scandals. Journal 
of Law and Economics, 48, 371-406. 
Anggraini, F., Astri, N. D., Minovia, A. F. (2020). Pengaruh strategi bisnis, capital 
intensity, dan multinationality terhadap tax avoidance. Menara Ilmu, 14(2), 36-45.      
Baber, W., Kang,S., Liang,L., & Zhu, Z. (2010). Shareholder rights, corporate governance 
and accounting restatement. Working paper, Georgetown University, USA. 
Baber, W.R, Liang, S. L, & Zhu, Z. (2012). Associations between internal and external 
Corporate Governance Characteristics: Implications for Investigating Financial 
Accounting Restatements. Accounting Horizons, 26(2), 219-237. 
Balakrishnan, K., Blouin,J., & Guay, W. R. (2012). Does tax aggressiveness reduce 
financial reporting transparency? Working paper, University of Pennsylvania. 
Bargeron, L.L., Lehn, K.M.,&Zutter, C.J. (2010). Sarbanes-Oxley Act and corporate risk-
taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49,34-52 
Beasley, M. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director 
composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, 71(4), 443-65. 
Bedard, J.C, and Johnstone, K.M. (2004). Earnings manipulation risk, corporate 
governance risk, and auditors’ planning and pricing decisions. The Accounting 
Review, 79(2), 277-304. 
Beneish, M.D. (1999). Incentives and penalties related to earnings overstatements that 
violate GAAP. The Accounting Review, 74(4), 425–457. 
Bentley, K. A., Homer,T. C., & Sharp, N. Y. (2013). Business strategy, financial reporting 
irreguralities and audit efforts. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30 (2), 780-817.  
Blaufus, K., Möhlmann, A., & Schwäbe, A. N. (2019). Stock price reactions to news about 
corporate tax avoidance and evasion. Journal of Economic Psychology, 72(C), 278-
292. 
Boussaidi, A., & Hamed, M. S. (2015). The impact of Governance Mechanism On Tax 
Aggressiveness: Empirical Evidence From Tunisian Context. Journal of Asian 
Business Strategy, 5(1), 1-12. 
Brochet, F., & Srinivasan, S. (2013). Accountability of independent directors: Evidence 
from firms subject to securities litigation. Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2), 
430-449. 
Burns, N., &Kadia, S. (2006). The impact of performance-based compenstion on 
misreporting. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(1), 35-67.  
Butar Butar, S. (2018). The causes and consequence of restatements in Indonesia. Jurnal 
Akuntansi dan Auditing Indonesia, 22(1), 70-80. 
Byrd, J.W., and Hickman, K.A. (1992). Do outside directors monitor managers?Evidence 
from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(2), 195–222. 
 Sansaloni Butar Butar 
 
Restatement and Tax Aggressiveness: Does Business Strategy Matter? 178 
 
Carcello, J., &Neal, T. (2002). Audit committee composition and auditor reporting. The 
Accounting review,75(4), 453-467. 
Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng,Q.,& Shevlin, T. (2010). Are family firms more tax aggressive 
than non-family firms? Journal of Financial Economics, 95, 41-61. 
Chen, X., Cheng,Q., & Lo, A. K. (2013). Is the decline in the information content of 
earnings following restatements short-lived?. Working paper, Singapore 
Management University, Singapore. 
Cohen, D.A., Dey, A., & Lys, T.Z. (2008). Real and accrual based-earnings management in 
the pre-and post-Sarbanes-Oxley periods. The Accounting Review,83(3), 757-787. 
Dechow, P., Sloan,R., & Sweeney, A. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings 
manipulation: an analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the 
SEC.Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 1-36. 
Desai, M.A., & Dharmapala, D. (2006). Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered 
incentives. Journal of Financial Economics, 79, 145-179. 
Desai, H., Hogan,C. & Wilkins, M. (2006). The reputational penalty for 
aggressiveaccounting: earnings restatements and management turnover. The 
Accounting Review, 81(1), 83-112. 
DeSarbo, W., Anthony, S.C., Song,M., & Sinha, I. (2005). Revisiting the Miles and Snow 
strategic framework: uncovering interrelationships between strategic types, 
capabilities, environmental uncertainty, and firm performance. Strategic Management 
Journal, 26 (1), 47–74. 
Dvorský, J., Petráková, Z., Khan, K. A., Formánek, I., & Mikoláš, Z. (2020). Selected 
aspectsof strategic management in the service sector. Journal of Tourism and 
Services, 11 (20), 109−123. 
Efendi, J., Srivastava,A., & Swanson, E. P. (2007). Why do corporate managers misstate 
financial statemens? The role of option compenstion and other factors. Journal of 
Financial  Economics, 85(3), 667-708.  
Engel, E., Hayes,R.M., & Wang, X. (2007). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and firms’going-
private decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44, 116-145. 
Flanagan, D.J, Muse,L.A., & O’Shaughnessy, K.C. (2008). An overview of 
accountingrestatement activity in the United States. International Journal of 
Commerce & Management, 18, 363-81. 
Fama, E.,& Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law & 
Economics, 26(2), 301-26. 
Faradiza, S. A. (2019).Dampak strategi bisnis terhadap penghindaran pajak. Journal of 
Applied Accounting and Taxation, 4(1),107-116  
Fuertes, G., Alfaro, M., Vergas, M., Gutierrez, S., Ternero, R. & Sabattin, R. 2020. 
Conceptual Framework for the Strategic Management: A Literature Review—
Descriptive. Journal of Engineering, 1-21.   
General Accounting Office (GAO). (2003). Financial statement restatements: trends, 
marketimpacts, regulatory responses, and remaining challenges. GAO-03-138. 
Washington,D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
Ghoshal, S. (2003). Miles and Snow: Enduring insights for managers. The Academy of 
Management Executive, 17(4), 109–114. 
Grossman, S. J, & Hart, O.D. (1986). The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of 
vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 691-719. 
 
AKUNTABILITAS 
Vol.15, No.2, Juli 2021 
 
Restatement and Tax Aggressiveness: Does Business Strategy Matter? 179 
 
Hartzell, J.C., Sun,L., &Titman,   S. (2014). Institutional investors as monitors of corporate 
diversification decisions: Evidence from real estate investment trusts. Journal of 
Corporate Finance,25(C), 61-72. 
Habib, A., Bhuiyan, B. U., & Wu, J. 2021. Corporate Governance Determinants of 
Financial Restatements: A Meta-Analysis. The International Journal of Accounting 
56(01), 1-71. 
Hassan, N. T. (2021). Accounting conservatism: Does business strategy and investment 
level matter? Accounting 7, 709–718. 
Hennes, K. M., Leone,A. J., & Miller, B. P. (2012). Accounting restatements and 
auditoraccountability. Working paper, University of Oklahoma, USA 
Higgins, D., Omer, T. C., & Phillips, J. D. (2015). The Influence of a Firm’s Business 
Strategy onits Tax Aggressiveness. Contemporary Accounting Research, 32(2), 674–
702. 
Hogan, C. E., and Wilkins, M. S. (2008). Evidence on the audit risk model: Do auditors 
increase audit fees in the presence of internal control deficiencies? Contemporary 
Accounting Research 25(1), 219–42. 
Hoi, C. K., Wu,Q., & Zhang, H. (2013). Is corporate social responsibility (CSR) associated 
with tax avoidance? Evidence from irresponsible CSR activities. The Accounting 
Review, 88(6), 2025–2059. 
Houge, N., Kerr, R., Monem, R., & Zijl, T. (2017). Business Strategy and Earnings 
Quality: A Cross-Country Study. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3092932   
Hribar, P., & Jenkins, N. T. (2004). The effect of accounting restatements on earnings 
revisions and the estimated cost of capital. Review of Accounting Studies, 9(2-3), 337-
356. 
Huang, C., & Nardi, P. C. C. 2020. Determinants of restatements in financial statements of 
Brazilian publicly traded companies. Journal of Accounting, Management and 
Governance, 23(2), 159-178. 
Ihsan, M., andMustikasari, E. (2018).The effect of strategy business on tax aggressiveness. 
Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics Symposium, 416-421  
Jain, P.K., & Rezaee, Z. (2006). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and capital market 
behavior: early evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research, 23(3), 629-654. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviour, 
agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–60. 
Kester, L. (2012). The effect of changing board of directors on audit fees following a 
financial restatement. Working Paper, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands.  
Klein, A. (2002). Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings 
Management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), 375-400. 
Kusumo, R. W., & Merianto W. (2014). Analisis Pengaruh karakteristik corporate 
governance terhadap keterjadian restatement. Diponegoro Journal of Accounting, 
828-838. 
Larcker, D. F., Richardson,S. A., & Tuna, I. (2007). Corporate governance, accounting 
outcomes, and organizational performance. The Accounting Review, 82(4), 963-1008. 
La Porta, P., Lopez-de-Silanes,F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the 
world. Journal of Finance,54(2), 471-517. 
Lobo, J., & Zhao, Y. 2013. Relation between audit effort and financial report misstatement: 
evidence from quarterly and annual restatements. The Accounting Review, 88(4), 
1385-1412. 
 Sansaloni Butar Butar 
 
Restatement and Tax Aggressiveness: Does Business Strategy Matter? 180 
 
Martinez, A. L., & Ferreira, B. A. (2019). Business Strategy and Tax Aggressiveness in 
Brazil. Journal of Strategy and Management, 12(4), 522-535.  
Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. (1978). Organizational strategy, structure and process. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. (2003). Organizational strategy, structure, and process. 
Stanford, CA: 
Mills, L., Erickson,M., & Maydew, E. (1998). Investments in tax planning. The Journal of 
the American Taxation Association,20(1), 1–20. 
Nasri, M. D., & Mohammadi, B. (2015). Evaluation Of The Impact Of Financial 
Restatements On Corporate Governance And Management Turnover. Indian Journal 
OfFundamental And Applied Life Sciences, 5(3), 1109–1119. 
Navissi, F., Sridharan, VG., Khedmati, M., Lim, E., Evdokimov, E. (2017). Business 
strategy, over-(under) investment and managerial compensation. Journal of 
Management Accounting Research, 29 (2), 63-86.  
Palmrose, Z.V.,& Scholz, S . (2004). The circumstances and legal consequences of non-
GAPP reporting: Evidence from restatements. Contemporary Accounting Research, 
21(1), 139–190. 
Palmrose, Z. V., Richardson,V., & Scholz, S. (2004). Determinants of market reactions 
torestatement announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37(1), 59-89. 
Pass, C. (2004). Corporate Governance and the Role of Non-Executive Directors in Large 
UK Companies: An Empirical Study. Corporate Governance, 4(2), 52-63. 
Phillips, J. (2003). Corporate tax-planning effectiveness: The role of compensation-based 
incentives. The Accounting Review,78(3), 847–74. 
Plumlee, M., & Yohn, T. L. (2010). An analysis of the underlying causes attributed 
torestatements. Accounting Horizons, 24(1), 41-64. 
Rajagopalan, N. (1997). Strategic orientations, incentive plan adoptions, and firm 
performance: Evidence from electric utility firms. Strategic Management Journal, 
18(10), 761–85. 
Richardson, S., Tuna, I., Wu,M. (2002). Predicting earnings management: The case of 
earnings restatements. Working paper, University of Pennsylvania, USA. 
Salehi, M., Tarighi, H. and Shahri, T.A. (2020). The effect of auditor characteristics on tax 
avoidance of Iranian companies. Journal of Asian Business and Economic Studies, 
27(2), 119-134. 
Scholz, S. (2014). Financial restatement trends in the United States: 2003-2012. Center for 
audit quality.  
Shleifer, A.,& Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large stockholders and corporate control. Journal of 
Political Economy, 94(3), 461-488. 
Simon, R. (1987). Accounting control systems and business strategy: An empirical 
analysis. Accounting, Organizations and Society,12(4), 357–74. 
Singh, P., & Agrawal, N. C. (2002). The effects of firm strategy on the level and structure 
of executive compensation. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences,19(1), 42–
56. 
Srinivasan, S. (2005). Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: 
evidence from accounting restatements and audit committee members. Journal of 
AccountingResearch, 43(2), 291-334 
Sudjiarto, A., Hartanto, S., Natalia; & Octaviana, S. (2020). Journal of Economics and 
Business, 3(1), 238-246.   
 
AKUNTABILITAS 
Vol.15, No.2, Juli 2021 
 
Restatement and Tax Aggressiveness: Does Business Strategy Matter? 181 
 
Surya, M. (2017). Analisis pengaruh strategi bisnis terhadap tingkat penghindaran pajak. 
Thesis. Universitas Sebelas Maret. Available at   HYPERLINK 
"https://eprints.uns.ac.id/35071/"  https://eprints.uns.ac.id/35071/  
Susanto, L., Yanti, & Viriani. (2018). Faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi agresivitas pajak. 
Jurnal ekonomi, 23. 
Wahyuni, L., Fahada, R., & Atmaja, B. (2017). The effect of business strategy, leverage, 
profitability, and sales growth on tax avoidance. Indonesian Management and 
Accounting Research, 16(2), 67-79.   
Wang, Y. (2017).Business Strategy, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Tax Avoidance. 
Working Paper. Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. Available at   HYPERLINK 
"../../User%20ID/Downloads/Wang_433527.pdf"  
file:///C:/Users/User%20ID/Downloads/Wang_433527.pdf . 
Wang, H., & Zhang, J. (2018). Securitizations and accounting restatements. Asian Review 
of Accounting, 26(4), 571-594. 
Wang, C., Brabenec, T., Gao, P., & Tang, Z. (2021). The Business Strategy, Competitive 
Advantage and Financial Strategy: A Perspective from Corporate Maturity 
Mismatched Investment. Journal of Competitiveness, 13(1), 164–181   
Wardani, D. K. & Khoiriyah, D. (2018). Pengaruh strategi bisnis dan karakteristik 
perusahaan terhadap penghindaran pajak. Akuntansi Dewantara, 2(1) 
Xie, B., Davidson,W.N., & Dadalt, P.J. (2003). Earnings management and corporate 
governance: the role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 9(3), 295-316. 
Zhang, I.X. (2007). Economics concequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 44, 74-115. 
Zheng, T., Jiang, W., Zhao, P., Jianf, J., & Wang, N. (2019). Will the Audit Committee 
Affects Tax Aggressiveness?. Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference 
on Management Science and Engineering Management. © Springer International 
Publishing AG.   
Zhizhong. H, Zhang,J., & Yanzhi,S., and Wenli, X. (2011). Does corporate governance 
affect restatement of financial reporting? Evidence from China. Nankai Business 


















 Sansaloni Butar Butar 
 
Restatement and Tax Aggressiveness: Does Business Strategy Matter? 182 
 
 
